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Abstract
Greece and its creditors concluded negotiations over a third bailout by signing a Mem-
orandum of Understanding on 19 August 2015. The dominant view among most eco-
nomic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the actions of the Greek gov-
ernment in the months before the deal have been erratic and lacked coordination. In
this paper we argue instead that the decisions of the Greek negotiators, including ask-
ing the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the creditors in a referendum, can
be explained by the logic of brinkmanship. We develop a game-theoretic model to show
that the actions of the Greek government are consistent with a strategy aimed at securing
concessions, which can be used to bolster domestic approval.
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1 Introduction
How to make sense of a process in which Greek voters loudly spurn a euro-zone
bail-out offer in a referendum, only to watch Alexis Tsipras, their prime minister,
immediately seek a worse deal that is flatly rejected by the euro zone, which in
turn presses a yet more stringent proposal to which Mr Tsipras humbly assents?
Better, perhaps, not to try (The dark clouds of peace, 2015).
What to make of the third Greek bailout deal? To the Economist, an advertent observer of
the Greek crisis, and many other commentators the answer is clear: “[R]ational actors would
never have got this far” (The way ahead, 2015). We beg to disagree.
We argue instead along the lines of Evans-Pritchard (2015) that the behaviour of the first
SYRIZA/ANEL government led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras from January until August
2015 can be consistently explained as that of an actor who “is playing an escalating game of
brinkmanship, trying to force Europe to give ground” on concessions that the Greek lead-
ership needed to garner domestic support. In our view, the actions of the Greek leadership
nevertheless reflect a notable departure from the strategy of earlier Greek governments. In
the previous bailout negotiations Greece was “able to combine the threat of default (which
would create an unknown and potentially massive risk for the EU), a promised commitment
to economic reforms that would put it on the road to self-sufficiency, and its ‘too small to fail’
status to gain extraordinary financial support” (Bulow and Rogoff, 2015). In our interpreta-
tion of the third bailout negotiations, the Greek grand strategy was not based on the outright
threat of default. It instead involved the indirect threat of a ‘Graccident,’ viz., an accidental
exit from the eurozone under the worst possible circumstances, to gain concessions that oth-
erwise would not have been achievable. The reasons for employing this strategy were most
probably two: First, the eurozone felt much better prepared for the fallout from a possible
orderly ‘Grexit’ and, second, contagion effects within the eurozone failed to materialise. In
our view the brinkmanship strategy was a rational response to the new circumstances. In this
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paper, which combines reporting on recent developments with analysis, we offer a political-
economy perspective on this.1
We emphasise several themes. First, many observers of and commentators on the Greek
bailout negotiations seem not to have grasped the essence of the Greek brinkmanship strat-
egy. The very logic of brinkmanship is to avoid having to actually prove that one is prepared
to do something irrational. Instead brinkmanship revolves around convincing the other side
that one is prepared to take higher and higher risks of accidentally pulling everyone over the
brink: “If two climbers are tied together, and one wants to intimidate the other by seeming
about to fall over the edge, there has to be some uncertainty or anticipated irrationality or it
won’t work” (Schelling, 2008, 99).2 By engaging in brinkmanship the Greek government was
probably able to induce the creditors to make a bailout offer that would otherwise not have
been made.
Second, the brinkmanship strategy of the Tsipras government could work because Greece
was, on the one hand, totally unprepared to leave the eurozone in an orderly manner but also,
on the other hand, committed not to give in to the demands of the creditors for as long as pos-
sible. On the tactical level this meant that the country was exposed to the risk of a Graccident
due to the consequences of insecurity and capital flight. Yet the strategy of applying pres-
sure by keeping the eurozone future of Greece in limbo actually gave the Greek government
a bargaining advantage. It is well possible that the creditor countries and institutions kept
a harder than necessary line initially, hoping that being in trouble would bring the Greeks
to heel sooner or later. In fact, the pressure seems to have worked the other way round: As
long as the Greek economy was in limbo, it was also in danger of going over the brink, and
the longer this was the case, the greater became the risk of a Graccident—something which
everyone wanted to avoid.
1This paper reflects the state of affairs at late September 2015.
2The fact that the very leader of the Greek negotiating team, Yanis Varoufakis, constantly confronted and pro-
voked his interlocutors certainly reinforced the impression that the danger of an inadvertent but permanent rift
was there. Throughout the negotiations Varoufakis played this role remarkably well. Once the brinkmanship
strategy had succeeded however, he did not suit his purpose any more and was consequently asked to resign.
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Third, by holding a referendum the embattled Greek government did a perfectly ratio-
nal thing from a strategic bargaining perspective. This, too, seems to have been completely
misunderstood by many observers, who asked what sense it made to vote on a proposal that
was already off the table. For instance, the president of the German Institute for Economic
Research (DIW), Marcel Fratzscher, lambasted the referendum as a political and economic
catastrophe for Greece (Fratzscher, 2015). In our view, the referendum was instead a shrewd
tactical move, serving two purposes: It further delayed the negotiations and worked as a com-
mitment device, ensuring that the creditors would need to accommodate the fact that the
terms of their proposal were unacceptable by improving the terms of the bailout. Put differ-
ently, the referendum was a stratagem to hold out for a better deal. In fact Tsipras kept telling
the voters precisely that the rejection of earlier-offered terms should not be seen as “a man-
date for rupture with Europe, but a mandate that bolsters our negotiating strength to achieve
a viable deal” (Marsden, 2015, emphasis added). The decisive ‘no’ vote was supposed to leave
Europe with two options: Give us concessions (forgive some debt) or, worse, face the risk of a
Grexit (Whelan, 2015).
Fourth, although the third bailout definitely amounts to a brutal diktat of terms, it in fact
contains a number of points which Tsipras can certainly cite in his favour. First of all, he se-
cured financing of the new Greek government, which was not sustainable without financial
assistance. Indeed, one cannot avoid the impression that the creditors gradually accommo-
dated the Greeks in the months before the third bailout agreement. To start with, according
to media reports, there was in December 2014 “already broad agreement on the scope of the
aid. Greece is expected to be granted around ¤10 billion, and the ESM will not be required
to raise any additional funds for it” (Pauly et al., 2014). After the election of Tsipras the cred-
itors then appear to have offered Greece loans of around ¤15.5 billion ($ billion) in return
for a five-month extension of the existing financial assistance agreement. Greece, in con-
trast and despite of all the talk about a rejection of austerity, did ask for considerably more
money and the new bailout. Then, in January 2015, reports spoke of behind-the-scenes talks
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over a third bailout “amounting to ¤30 billion” (Steinbock, 2015). One month later, it was
reported that “a third Greek bailout could run as much as ¤37.8 billion if Varoufakis’ plans
are adopted in full” (Spiegel, 2015a). In March 2015 “Spain’s economy minister said euro
zone countries were discussing a new rescue plan for the country worth between¤30-50 bil-
lion [. . . ] but European Union (EU) officials said there were no such talks” (Ellyatt, 2015).
Clearly, the promised amount of further financial assistance accommodated the increasing
needs of Greece. Yet it also became clear at the same time that the creditors wanted to see
that political cost would be paid. (Strupczewski, 2015). Another point Tsipras can sell his
voters is that the third bailout is covered by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (for le-
gal details see Megliani, 2014, 586), since it can be argued that the ESM facilitates, due to its
inclusion of standardised and identical collective action clauses (CAC), an orderly restructur-
ing of government debt (Stephanou and Gortsos, 2012, 24). Tsipras will definitely also cite in
his favour to have secured the five-year “Juncker investment plan” the magnitude of which
(¤35 billion ($38 billion)) actually exceeds the fiscal savings Greece is required to realise in
the same period. Under the terms of the third Greek bailout, the primary surplus targets are
also reduced, which amounts to an easing worth¤20 billion ($22 billion). The perhaps most
important achievement of all, yet certainly not something the Greek leadership will tell the
public, is that the fiscal bill will not immediately be picked up by the Greek voters but only
after the next election. As we see it, securing a grace period, during which elections could be
held before austerity would kick back in, was certainly an important objective of the Greek
leadership’s grand strategy.
However, the Greek negotiators did obviously not secure the most important prize: A for-
mal commitment of the creditors to provide debt relief. Exactly this is what would have made
the deal “viable.” Of course, that would also have given Tsipras a huge boost in popularity.
On the other hand, he did at least secure the endorsement of debt relief by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and public promises of European leaders that some restructuring of
the debt would be considered in the future.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we recall the most im-
portant events leading to the third Greek bailout. In section 3, after some preliminary re-
marks (3.1), we explore the strategic bargaining situation between the Greece and its creditor
countries/institutions by help of a strategic bargaining game (3.2). Section 4 sums up and
concludes.
2 A narrative of events leading to the third Greek bailout
Five years into the debt crisis, with the country having experienced a loss of more than 25%
of its GDP and a catastrophic increase in unemployment, the new Prime Minister of Greece,
Alexis Tsipras, came to power in January 2015 on the ticket of having promised an exhausted
electorate to undo painful economic reforms, and to insist in a write-down of the country’s
¤320 billion ($344 billion) of debt. Initially some commentators expressed the hope that the
victory of his ultra-left wing alliance SYRIZA, which ended a 40-year era of alternating rule by
the socialist PASOK and the conservative New Democracy, could inspire both the Greeks to
implement reforms and Europe to seriously discuss the idea of debt relief (Hope and Barber,
2015a).
Those commentators were quickly let down. The new Greek coalition government of
SYRIZA and the right-wing ANEL party, mostly represented abroad by the combative finance
minister Yanis Varoufakis, immediately embarked on a collision course with the very coun-
tries and institutions that had already helped Greece twice to stay afloat financially. The in-
creasingly tumultuous events that followed were just what the media were waiting for. On 9
April 2015 the government, having apparently raided the state coffers, met an IMF loan pay-
ment deadline of¤459 million ($493 million) and thus avoided at the last possible moment a
credit event. However, on the very day of payment—and to the intense displeasure of not only
its European partners—Prime Minister Tsipras met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Moscow to discuss the prospects of deeper bilateral cooperation. In a move that “could bring
6
the euro crisis to a head" (Rachman, 2015) the Greek government had two days earlier an-
gered particularly eurozone powerhouse Germany by floating the staggering figure of¤278.7
billion ($300.6 billion) in demand for reparations from World War Two. Even the German
Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, who belongs to the country’s Social Democratic Party and
who had expressed understanding for the social hardships austerity had brought to Greece
during an earlier visit of Tsipras to Berlin, bluntly called the demand “stupid” (ibid.).
Tsipras’ visit to Berlin in March came two weeks after German public opinion became
heavily polarised over the ‘Fingergate,’ as a rather absurd blame game over whether Varo-
ufakis had once, during a conference presentation years before he entered politics, literally
given Germany the middle finger, became to be known (Sauerbrey, 2015). Greece had by the
end of March failed to secure an endorsement of its list of proposed economic and struc-
tural reforms from the ‘Brussels Group,’ consisting of EU and IMF representatives advising
the ‘Euro Working Group,’ which in turn directly reports to the Eurogroup finance ministers.
With an agreement an earlier promised¤7.2 billion ($8.1 billion) of undisbursed funds from
the second bailout could have been unlocked quickly, and Greece could have secured valu-
able breathing space. This would also have lowered the risk that Greece might be running out
of cash and be forced to choose between meeting the next loan payment deadline and paying
pensioners and public employees.
Months of tense negotiations—and a media reporting firestorm—ensued. Just when all
seemed to imply a compromise and an end of the prolonged deadlock the negotiations were
broken off on 26 June 2015. Existing hopes of reaching a compromise solution did almost
completely dissipate when Tsipras unexpectedly announced that a referendum on the credi-
tors’ demands would be held on 5 July 2015. This move not only surprised his European part-
ners but also people in Greece and the global financial markets. Apparently the Greek leaders
were completely convinced that “[i]n the months of negotiations, deadlock, and stalemate
that led up to this [. . . ] dramatic referendum vote, somewhere along the way Greece took
on new significance, transforming from a peripheral member of the West that accounts for
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a mere 3 percent of the eurozone’s GDP to a pivotal country” (Bechev, 2015). By announc-
ing a referendum Tsipras clearly escalated the crisis: The country’s on-going bailout program
expired on 30 June and the Greek authorities announced that they would not pay the equiv-
alent of¤1.6 billion ($1.74 billion) to the IMF due the same day. In order to stem the outflow
of capital from the already struggling Greek banking system, a bank holiday and strict capital
controls were imposed in Greece. Bank withdrawals were limited to¤60 ($65 ) per day for or-
dinary depositors and¤120 ($130) for pensioners. Now “[t]he question of Greece’s euro-zone
membership [had] been officially opened” (Gordon and Kennedy, 2015).
With Greece having effectively become “the first advanced economy to default to the fund
in its 71-year history” (Donnan, 2015) the IMF now faced a dilemma: Letting Greece off the
hook would, on the one hand, raise serious questions about the fund’s impartiality and in-
tegrity. On the other hand, a Greek default to the IMF could trigger cross-default clauses in
Greece’s Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement with the European Financial Stabil-
ity Facility (EFSF), which would then give the right to Greece’s European creditors to frontload
payments on EFSF loans (Ruparel, 2015). An officially acknowledged default could then have
wider consequences because cross-default clauses of Greek private-sector bonds might set
forth a chain reaction of credit events. The European Central Bank (ECB) on its part could
then sooner or later be forced to cut the only lifeline of the Greek banking sector and cancel
the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA); it decided to keep steering a middle
course and maintained ELA at the same level as the one fixed in the previous review (Euro-
pean Central Bank, 2015a). All this meant that some solution needed to be found until the
critical deadline of 20 July, when Greece would need to repay around ¤3.5 billion ($3.8 bil-
lion) in bond redemptions to the ECB. The time to find a solution became increasingly short.
The referendum in Greece was held on Sunday, 5 July 2015. The government had cam-
paigned for a ‘no’ vote and opinion polls predicted a head-to-head race. In the evening of the
same day it became clear that the Greeks had indeed rejected the latest proposal of the cred-
itors with almost a 62% majority (Nationwide referendum results, 2015). In the words of one
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analyst, Greece had hit the self-destruct button by voting no (McArdle, 2015). The key ques-
tion was how long the countdown towards self-destruction would last. Greece meanwhile of-
ficially requested a new bailout from the ESM. Yet an agreement on this could not be simply
pulled from a hat (for the following see Spiegel, 2015b): What would happen next depended
on the political response from the pivotal actors in the Greek bailout drama; these however
did not have completely aligned interests and needed to co-ordinate far-reaching decisions
in a very short period of time. First, the European Commission (EC) would need to evaluate
whether the requested bailout could pose risks to financial stability in the euro area. Next the
Eurogroup would need to officially open negotiations on the conditions of the bailout, which
would require votes in several parliaments, including the German Bundestag. Even if the Eu-
rogroup could conclude these negotiations quickly—which seemed unlikely—the terms of
the bailout would require fresh parliamentary votes. The only thing Greece could hope for in
the short term was an official promise from the creditors of how the requested bailout might
look like.
In the limited time available to find a solution several things could have happened that
would have led to an unprepared and involuntary Greek exit from the eurozone—a so-called
‘Graccident’ (for this and the following see Dabrowski, 2015): If the ECB reduced or cancelled
ELA altogether the Greek banks would be insolvent and close immediately. This would im-
pose considerable additional hardship on the cash-based Greek economy, destroy trust and
certainly further reduce prospects of future growth. Perhaps the economy could stagger on
for a while with banks closed. Yet sooner or later the government would need to choose be-
tween reverting to a national currency, by converting existing Euro-denominated bank ac-
counts into the new currency, or forcing the Bank of Greece (BoG) to provide Greek banks with
unauthorised euro-denominated liquidity.3 Such a hostile takeover of the BoG—which was
3Interestingly, it seems that Greece’s finance minister Varoufakis had devised an alternative route to secure
transactions could be conducted in euro as part of a clandestine contingency plan, as he revealed in a telecon-
ference with private investors on 16 July 2015. This plan seems to have involved the creation of reserve accounts
secretly attached to every taxpayer’s ID that could be used to make payments to other taxpayers outside of the
‘official’ banking system. According to Varoufakis, “[t]hat would have created a parallel banking system while
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apparently exactly what the so-called Left Platform of communist hardliners within SYRIZA
wanted (cf. Hope and Barber, 2015b)—would certainly lead to a rupture with the ECB. An-
other possibility was that the Greek government might run out of cash. Capital flight and
uncertainty had already negatively affected the growth prospects of the Greek economy (Eu-
ropean Commission sharply cuts Greek growth, primary surplus forecasts, 2015). As a result,
the government was not enjoying a primary surplus anymore, which meant that it would not
even have a choice between paying pensions or salaries and honouring its financial obliga-
tions: Already Greece could do neither of these two things.
With analysts putting a 50% chance of a chaotic Greek exit from the eurozone, leaders
gathered in Brussels for last-ditch negotiations on 12 July—“the most critical moment in the
history of the EU” (The way ahead, 2015, 11) according to the president of the European
Council, Donald Tusk. After arduous talks behind closed doors—and apparently some pretty
nasty political manoeuvring—Tusk announced tongue-in-cheek on the morning of 13 July
“we have an a-Greek-ment” (Pain without end, 2015, 8). The deal thrashed out over 17 hours
would avert Grexit or Graccident for the time being, address Greece’s refinancing needs with
a promised package of¤82 billion -¤86 billion ($90 billion - $94 billion), including a buffer
of ¤10 billion - ¤25 billion ($11 billion-$27 billion) for bank recapitalisation and resolution
costs, promised a short-term EU Commission investment plan in the magnitude of¤35 bil-
lion ($38 billion) and provided for a bridge financing package of¤7 billion ($7.7 billion) (Eu-
ropean Council 2015b, 2ff., European Council 2015a).
What did Greece have to do to make the money flowing again (for this and the following
see What Greece must do to receive a new bail-out, 2015)? On 15 July—exactly two days after
the euro summit—the Hellenic Parliament had to pass legislation on pension cuts, value-
added tax reform, collective wage bargaining and the establishment of quasi-automatic pub-
lic spending constraints. One week later, on 22 July, a second set of reform laws, including
the banks were shut as a result of the ECB’s aggressive action, to give us some breathing space” (Spiegel and
Hope, 2015). The plan apparently also entailed that “at the drop of a hat it could be converted to a new drachma”
(Babington, 2015).
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the adoption of the EU Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive, needed to be enacted. As if
all this were not enough, Greece will have to, among other things, reform her pension system
and labour markets, open hitherto closed professions, ‘de-politicise’ her administration—
and do all this under scrutiny from observers that will represent the institutions formerly
known as the troika. From now on Greece would be drip-fed bailout funds only in return
for reforms implemented. Most humiliatingly however, the Greek authorities were required
deposit “valuable Greek assets” with an independent privatisation fund that is supposed to
raise ¤50 billion ($55 billion). In the damning words of the former Greek Finance Minis-
ter Yanis Varoufakis, this programme was doomed to fail and will “go down in history as the
greatest disaster of macroeconomic management ever” (Greece debt crisis: Reforms ‘will fail’
- Varoufakis, 2015).
The new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 19 August 2015. The very
next day, eight months after he came to power for the first time, Tsipras stepped down to
trigger elections. In the evening of election day on 20 September the exit polls showed Tsipras
had won by a significantly bigger margin than expected. While Tsipras was obviously not
able to put an end to austerity, it seems that his brinkmanship strategy had worked at least
insofar as to ensuring his re-election. Perhaps the deal, despite the painful economic costs of
brinkmanship and further austerity, will give him an advantage also in the next elections.
3 Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations
3.1 Preliminary remarks
A central feature of all crises is a sense of urgency, and in many cases urgency
becomes the most compelling crisis characteristic. Situations change so dramat-
ically and so rapidly that no one seems to be able to predict the chain of events
or the possible outcomes. An important aspect of such crisis situations is the
dynamics that evolve during days, hours, and even minutes. [. . . ] Leaders and
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decision-makers are often caught by surprises after surprises produced by many
forces (Farazmand, 2001, 3-4).
In this section we interpret the Greek strategy of escalation of the crisis as a rational strategy
of “coercive diplomacy,” where the objective of the coercer is to induce behavioural change in
the coerced; pressure is applied by communicating the own willingness to face disaster. Put
differently, we contend that an escalation may serve as a deliberate risk-generation mecha-
nism with ultimately strategic aims (cf. Schelling, 2008, 101).
We can most probably safely assume that both Greece and its creditors understand that
cohesion of the euro area is both in the collective as well as the national interest: “Every
member of the euro area has a vital interest in ensuring that its partners are meeting the
membership requirements—and not just at the point of entry, but continuously” (European
Central Bank, 2015b). At the same time, in order to ensure that a country stays in the euro,
both the eurozone as well as the country in question need to be at least not worse off in
the union: “If there are parts of the euro area that are worse off inside the Union, doubts
may grow about whether they might ultimately have to leave” (European Central Bank, 2014).
Certainly, if the euro area were a full-fledged economic and fiscal union, it would be much
more capable of absorbing asymmetric shocks than it is in its current shape. Yet as things
stand, the very incompleteness of the monetary union in conjunction with great differences
in national shock-absorption capabilities challenge the notion that the euro is irrevocable in
all member states (cf. Fidrmuc, 2015).
Seen from a strategic bargaining perspective, the ambiguity surrounding the irrevocabil-
ity of euro membership means that both a coordinated as well as an unplanned and thus
potentially disastrous exit from the euro is a possibility rational actors should take into ac-
count. This in turn means that countries with better shock absorption capabilities as well
as less capable countries in need of support can strategically employ the explicit or implicit
threat of a euro exit. Yet whereas the announcement of a euro exit means the initiation of
certain disaster, “one can initiate a moderate risk of mutual disaster if the other party’s com-
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pliance is feasible within a short enough period to keep the cumulative risk within tolerable
bounds” (Schelling, 2008, 91, with emphasis). We contend that the rational manipulation of
the risk of an accidental euro exit can be interpreted as a key component of Tsipras’ strategy.
Early remarks of the Greek ex-Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis indeed seem to imply that
this was right from the start of the negotiations the Greek negotiators’ game plan:
The only thing you can really do is negotiate with the rest of Europe [. . . ]. But to
negotiate, to be taken seriously, you have to have a credible threat. You have to
be prepared to blow the whole thing up, simply by being intransigent if you are not
taken seriously. So, this is my recommendation: Prepare for a very tough, very
painful, potentially explosive negotiation (Nasiripour, 2015, emphasis added).
While it is true that Tsipras had promised to put an end to austerity in his 2014/5 election
campaign and to cancel unpopular measures like the consolidated tax on property owner-
ship (ENFIA), one should not discount a priori that Tsipras was not prepared to soft-pedal
after becoming prime minister. Yet, in order to cut down on his promises, he would need to
come back to Greece from the bailout negotiations with a package deal having in it enough
to show to the voters. In any case, seen from a strategic bargaining perspective, during the
negotiations the grandiose campaign pledges worked as a commitment device: Every devi-
ation by the Greek leadership from them would be perceived as a humiliation; in a deal the
Greek leadership would then demand some form of compensation, for instance lower budget
surplus targets, a stimulus package from the EU commission or—ideally—debt relief.
In what follows we argue that one can both consistently interpret the course of events in
line with the theme that the strategic calculus of the Greek negotiators combined brinkman-
ship with commitment in order to force the creditors to give in on key demands. We thus
militate against the view held by some that the Greek government did not have a strategy; the
fact that “[t]he Greek red lines—the points of principle on which this government refuses to
budge—on labour rights, against cuts in poverty-level pensions and fire-sale privatizations—
have been in plain view from day one” (Galbraith, 2015) does not at all mean that the Greek
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leadership was not prepared to play ball. Yet the claim to have unmovable red lines needs to
be backed up with something real—perhaps a referendum?—if it is to be credible, otherwise
it is just cheap talk.
We also militate against the view that the SYRIZA government came to a gunfight armed
only with a knife, meaning that it had the wrong strategy for the right purpose. Observers of
the negotiations holding this view argue that Greece did in fact play the brinkmanship card
yet did not, for some reason, understand that the game was over before it began, since it
could only credibly threaten with a default as long as it had a large enough primary surplus
to pay for domestic public expenditures (Kaletsky, 2015). We argue that there is a difference
between threatening openly to default and running the deliberate risk of an accidental euro
exit, with all the disastrous consequences this would entail for all sides.
Last but not least we are completely unconvinced that the Greek government not only
had a rational strategy but in fact enjoyed an extremely strong bargaining position because
it had the “diabolical plan B” (Bershidsky, 2015) of “escalating tensions between the country
and its creditors” and “driving up the costs [. . . ] for the other side, by allowing capital flight
by its citizens” in order to maximise euro-denominated TARGET2 claims vis-à-vis the BoG
and thus “to secure a far more favourable outcome—including increased financial assistance
and reduced reform requirements—than it could have gained at any point in the past” ()Sinn
2015; cf. Moro 2014, S19ff.).4 We instead share the view of Karl Whelan that, even if the exact
effects of a hypothetical euro breakup for European central banks are still open to dispute, the
risks for German citizens due to the TARGET2 balance are most probably over-hyped (Whe-
lan, 2014); it is therefore unlikely that the threat of a critical hit to the Bundesbank should
have featured in the strategic calculus of the Greek negotiators.
In our view, the negotiations between Greece and its creditors can best be described as a
game of reciprocal coercive diplomacy. Alexander George defines coercive diplomacy as “ef-
forts to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon”
4TARGET stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System.
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(George, 1997, 5). It is a response to an encroachment already undertaken and thus differ-
ent from deterrence, which aims at making sure that an opponent will not undertake an en-
croachment in the future. Put differently, the objective of coercive diplomacy is to persuade
the opponent to change course by threatening or actually using some form of force, viz., ca-
pability to inflict pain, not to trigger a catastrophic event.
The eurozone creditors, on the one hand, clearly perceived that the SYRIZA/ANEL gov-
ernment was back-pedalling on reforms and wanted to make the them change course on
this. They also did definitely not want to reward populist campaign pledges with their tax-
payers’ money. The SYRIZA/ANEL government, on the other hand,—most probably having
already the next elections in mind—needed to get some politically valuable concessions. To
reach their objective, they employed the tactic of deliberately increasing the reform costs (as
a commitment device) coupled with brinkmanship, viz., “the tactic of deliberately letting the
situation get somewhat out of hand,” (Schelling, 1980, 200) in order to make it more intoler-
able to the other side and force its accommodation. “It means harassing and intimidating an
adversary by exposing him to a shared risk, or deterring him by showing that if he makes a
contrary move he may disturb us so that we slip over the brink whether we want to or not,
carrying him with us” (ibid.).
3.2 The game
In this subsection we explore the strategic bargaining issues of the Greek bailout negotiations
by help of a sequential asymmetric-information game with two players, the creditor countries
and institutions (henceforth the eurozone player), on the one side, versus the Greek govern-
ment (henceforth Greece player) on the other side. Of course this model is not supposed to
fully reflect the complexity of the bargaining situation during the Greek bailout negotiations,
but it can still offer some insights into how the actors’ grand strategies perhaps looked like.
Table 1 shows the variables; the sets of players, strategies and payoffs are self-explanatory.
The game tree, decomposed in two halves for the convenience of the reader, is shown in Fig-
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ures 1 and 2. We are searching for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
The game tree tells the following story: The eurozone player E and the Greece player G
face negotiations about a bailout for the latter. For G , implementing economic and struc-
tural reforms, exiting in an orderly fashion from the eurozone to avoid reforms, crashing out
of the eurozone in a chaotic fashion and holding out to deliberately generate the risk of an
accident are all painful. Yet running the risk of a Graccident allows G to hold out for a bet-
ter deal by rejecting the terms of an initial bailout. The game begins by E choosing between
offering G a package deal (financial assistance combined with conditionality). If E chooses
not to offer G a bailout, and the latter does not hold out for a better deal, G must choose be-
tween either exiting the eurozone, which is costly to both players, or implementing reforms
that will enable it to stand on the own feet financially. In this case G must bear the (political)
costs of reforms. This choice is the same for G if a bailout offer was made but rejected and G
does not hold out. If a bailout offer was made and immediately accepted, G gets a positive
payoff in the form of politically-relevant benefits, for instance increased popularity for hav-
ing secured concessions, like credible promises of future debt relief, which can be exploited
domestically. However, the benefits of a bailout will invariably be reduced by the political
costs of the structural reforms, R, demanded in return. In accordance with the dictum that
“[r]elations between the euro zone and Greece are defined in terms of the “concessions” each
has screwed out of the other” (My big fact Greek divorce, 2015) we assume that concessions
to G (V1 at this stage of the game) are being perceived as politically costly by the eurozone
player. Put more simply: Concessions are a zero-sum game.
If G chooses to hold out, a different subgame develops. Holding out means that a later re-
form may become much more costly. To reflect this, we introduce a variable D that expresses
the severity of the negative consequences caused by delaying a resolution of the impasse—
think of capital flight and closed banks, reduced short-term growth prospects, etc.—, which
of course translate into political costs for G , but also increase the amount of resources that
need to be redistributed from E to G in case of a bailout agreement. Holding out does more-
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over mean that implementing reforms may become even more costly if the population rejects
them. In order to reflect this, we introduce a move by nature which determines whether re-
forms are politically feasibly and thus not costly (L = 0 with a probability h), or rejected by
the population (L >C XG −R with the probability 1−h). The first outcome is meant to capture
the effect of the Greek leadership losing the referendum in the model, the second outcome is
meant to capture the effect of winning the referendum.5
In each of these two cases the game continues with the commitment subgame. The first
move here is made by N who decides with a probability q the type of G : The tough type of
G is firm in its commitment; if this is so, G can deliberately run the risk of a Graccident in
order to extract concessions from E . The probability q is known to both players; yet the type
of G is private information and only known to the Greece player. The true state of the world
after the initial act of nature is thus unknown to the eurozone player, who has to move next
and decide on whether it offers G a bailout or not. Commitment to brinkmanship works the
following way: It rules out the option for the Greece player to respond to the move of E by
avoiding the risk of a Graccident. The game thus reflects the strategic case that “when both
parties abhor collision the advantage goes often to the one who arranges the status quo in his
favour and leaves to the other side the “last clear chance” to stop or turn aside” (Schelling,
2008, 44).6
If no bailout is being offered by E , a committed Greece player cannot but run the risk of
a Graccident. If that event occurs, both players will be burdened with the costs of a chaotic
Greek exit. If no such thing occurs, G can choose to implement those painful economic and
5We of course assume in our game that the common knowledge assumption holds, that is, that the eurozone
player knows the possible moves of the Greece player, one of which is the referendum. Given that such a move
was from early on deliberated within the Greek government (see e.g. Barker and Hope, 2015), this assumption is
certainly not unrealistic.
6Schelling actually illustrates this case with an example from ancient Greek history: “Xenophon understood
the principle when, threatened by an attack he had not sought, he placed his Greeks with their backs against an
impassable ravine. “I should like the enemy to think it is easy-going in every direction for him to retreat.” [. . . ] The
“last chance” to clear out was left to the enemy when Xenophon had to take the initiative, but denied to himself
when he wanted to deter attack, leaving his enemy the choice to attack or retire” (Schelling, 2008, 45). Schelling
is perhaps referring to Xenophon, Anabasis, 4.2.11 (Xenophon, 1922, 271).
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structural reforms needed in order to live within the own means; the reform costs are given
by R; yet these costs are increased by two factors: The costs D of holding out, which definitely
accrue to G if it enters the negotiation game, plus the political fallout from the referendum.
The Greece player can alternatively opt for an orderly exit from the monetary union, which
would mean certain costs for both players. In contrast to this, a noncommitted Greece player
can choose between the Graccident risk and playing safe; this means then the choice between
reform and Grexit.
Table 1: Variables
Variables Description
i =G ,E Players: Greece (G), eurozone (E)
R Costs for G of economic reforms (R > 0)
D Costs for G of holding out (D > 0)
L Cost increase for G in terms of political fallout from referendum (L > 0)
C Xi Costs for player i of an ordered Greek exit from the eurozone (Grexit)(
C Xi > 0
)
C Ai Costs for player i of a chaotic Greek exit from the eurozone (Graccident)(
C Ai > 0
)
p Probability of a Graccident (0< p < 1)
q Probability of a successful commitment (0< q < 1)
h Probability of significant costs of delayed reforms (0< h < 1)
V1 Payoff of initial bailout offer in terms of concessions that can be exploited
domestically (V1 > 0)
V2 Payoff of improved bailout offer in terms of concessions that can be ex-
ploited domestically (V2 > 0)
In what follows we explore parameter constellations of the model that result in different
equilibria. The parameter constellations (1), (2) and (3) defining the following cases describe
solutions of commitment game tree, which are being anticipated by the Greece player in its
solution of the negotiation game. Since a complete solution of the game would be beyond the
scope of this paper, we confine the analysis to three cases: The good, the bad and the ugly,
as seen from the perspective of the Greece player. We will not only show that non-empty sets
of model parameters implying such equilibria exist, but also that these cases are not unreal-
istic. Put differently, we show that the actions of the Greek government might be explained
18
Figure 1: Game tree of the negotiation game
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by assuming that it followed a strategy aimed at securing concessions, which could then be
exploited to garner domestic support. We restrict the parameter space to such constellations
that fulfil certain conditions: First of all, we assume R +L >C XG > R, which simply means for
the Greece player delayed reforms are worse than an immediate Grexit and the latter worse
than immediate reforms. We also assume V2−R −L > −C XG , which means that an improved
bailout offer by E must ensure that G remains in the eurozone, even given the negative effects
of holding out for the improved bailout package V2.7
3.3 Case I: The good
This is the case of high risk costs that the Greece player is firmly committed, relative to bailout
costs V2. It is defined by the parameter constellation
V2 < pqC AE <C XE +pq
(
C AE −C XE
)
. (1)
The term pqC AE expresses the expected costs caused by the risk that the Greece player could
be firmly committed and that therefore a Graccident is likely. The term C XE + pq
(
C AE −C XE
)
expresses the expected costs for E if it encounters the Greece player for which L >C XG −R in
the commitment game. Note that in this case (and the other two cases) if L = 0 the Greece
player would prefer implementing reforms over Grexit. It would then never get a second-
round offer V2 as long as the costs associated with this for the eurozone player exceed the risk
costs.
In Case I the Graccident risk is so high relative to the value V2 of improved bailout terms
that E would definitely offer them in the commitment game, independently of the value of L;
this will of course be anticipated by the Greece player. G , solving the game backwards, will
choose its strategy by comparing the payoffs of different courses of action. If G chooses to
7We also assume V2 > D ; V2 > L; V2−L > D ; C AG > R +D +L and C AG > V2+R to ensure the outcomes of the
game are not illogical. For example, the last assumptions ensures that for the Greece player a Graccident is the
worst possible outcome.
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hold out for a better deal the payoff will be
piDG = (1−h)(V2−R−D)+h(V2−D−L−R)
If G opts against brinkmanship and does not enter the commitment stage, it would immedi-
ately implement reforms and realize the payoff
pinDG =−R.
For comparison, if G does not hold out and E would have made an offer V1 in the negotiation
game, the payoff would be piacG = V1−R. Since we have assumed V2 > D +L, holding out is
dominant. In this case G would accept any bailout offer that fulfils
V1 >V2−D−hL.
At the same time, as long as V1 <V2 the eurozone player would already make an initial bailout
offer in the negotiation game. This would be the ideal outcome for the Greece player: E would
make an adequate initial bailout offer which G would accept; there would be no need for
brinkmanship and the costs for all actors the lowest possible. Such a nice outcome depends
of course on the parameters of the game; with different parameters the outcome may change
considerably, which leads us to the next case.
3.4 Case II: The bad
This is the case of low risk costs that the Greece player is firmly committed, relative to bailout
costs V2. It is defined by the parameter constellation
pqC AE <C XE +pq(C AE −C XE )<V2. (2)
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In this case the Greece player is under increased pressure and will shy away from brinkman-
ship. Regardless of whether G is willing to implement reforms, the eurozone player would
never make an second bailout offer in the commitment game and also no initial bailout offer
in the negotiation game. In that case G’s payoff amounts to
piDG = (1−h)
{
q
(
p(−C AG −D)+ (1−p)(−R−D)
)+ (1−q)(−R−D)}
+h {q [p(−C AG −D)+ (1−p)(−C XG −D)]+ (1−q)(−C XG −D)}
if it nevertheless holds out and
pinDG =−R
if it opts to comply by choosing reform in the negotiation game. Interestingly, G would never
opt to hold out, since it cannot induce E to make an offer and would choose reform anyway.
Such an offer would only make sense to E if V1 < 0, which is excluded by our assumptions. If
that were possible, we would have an equilibrium in which actually the Greece player would
have to transfer resources to the eurozone player in order to avoid being forced out of the
eurozone.
In our view this scenario provides a valuable lesson for how the strategy of Greece’s cred-
itors may have looked like. Obviously the tactic of increasing the political costs of giving
further support to an unruly Greek government, or taking the position that the fallout from
a Graccident were manageable, would have been a rational thing to do in the negotiation
stage of the game: The Greek leadership would be forced to bow to the inevitable and imple-
ment reforms without further ado. Perhaps the expectation that an outcome like this could
be achieved induced the eurozone to take a hard line. But it seems the game played out much
more messily, as in the next case.
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3.5 Case III: The ugly
This is the case where the costs of the second bailout V2 are higher than the costs of the risk
that the Greece player could stumble into a Graccident, yet lower than the costs E faces when
nature reveals that reforms are especially costly for G , which was exactly what happened in
the Greek referendum. Under these circumstances things get really ugly. Case III is defined
by the parameter constellation
pqC AE <V2 <C XE +pq
(
C AE −C XE
)
. (3)
In this case the equilibrium of the game is that G holds out for a better deal and E does not
make an initial offer V1, despite the fact that both players would be better off by finding an
agreement during the negotiation game and thus avoiding the commitment stage altogether.
The intuition behind this result is that both players bet on the value of L: The Greece player,
on the one hand, makes a wager that L will be high, that is, that the implementation of re-
forms will be even harder after holding out, which should of course be taken into account by
a rational eurozone player; the eurozone player, on the other hand, makes a wager that L will
be low and that therefore no need to accommodate the demands of G will arise.
In Case III, if L = 0 (viz., the Greek leadership loses the referendum), which happens with
the probability h, E would not make an offer V2. The reason for this is that, due to the condi-
tion R +L >C XG > R, the Greece player would then prefer to implement reforms over exiting
the eurozone. If however L turns out as high (viz., the Greek leadership wins the referendum),
which happens with the probability 1−h, E would come up with a better deal. Since, by as-
sumption, V2 >R+L−C XG this offer would definitely be accepted by G . Faced with the choice
between holding out or not G will compare the payoffs of both strategies, solving the game
by backwards induction. If G choses to hold out for V2 the payoff is
piDG = (1−h)
{
q
[
p
(−C AG −D)+ (1−p)(−D−R)]+ (1−q)(−D−R)}+h(V2−D−L−R).
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If G choses not to hold out for V2 the payoff is
pinDG =−R.
For comparison, if the eurozone player made an offer V1 and G accepted immediately its
payoff would be given by
piacG =V1−R
G will only hold out for a better deal (if it did not receive an initial offer V1) if piDG > pinDG .
Whether the Greece player prefers the strategy of holding out, thus running the risk to go
over the brink, depends on the probabilities of losing the referendum (h), the probability that
G is definitely committed to risk a Graccident (q) and the risk associated with it (p). The
strategy of holding out is preferred if h lies either in the interval
D
V2−L
< h < C
A
G +D−R
C AG −L−R+V2
(4)
and
0< q ≤ h(L−V2)+D
(h−1)(C AG −R) with 0< p < 1 (5)
or
D−h(V2−L)
(h−1)(C AG −R) < q < 1 with 0< p <
D−h(V2−L)
q(h−1)(C AG −R) , (6)
or h lies in the interval
C AG +D−R
C AG −L−R+V2
< h < 1 with 0< q < 1 and 0< p < 1 (7)
Even if the conditions (4)/(5), (4)/(6) or (7) hold, G would immediately accept a first
bailout offer V1 if piacG >piDG . For this to happen, the first offer basically has to be high enough
as to compensate the Greece player for refraining from brinkmanship and thus forgoing a
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potentially better offer V2. All parameter values
V1 > h
[
pq
(
C AG −R
)−L+V2]+pq (R−C AG )−D (8)
meet this condition. Interestingly, even if (8) holds and a mutually acceptable first bailout
deal V1 could be struck by the players, there are are parameter constellations where E still
does not make a such an offer. This happens if
C AE <
V1−hV2
(1−h)pq ,
which means that the Graccident costs for the eurozone player are too low to deter it from
entering the commitment stage. In this case unnecessarily high costs are being caused by
both players’ attempts to screw concessions out of the other side. This is a classical case
of a moral hazard: Although the eurozone player has a sufficient willingness to compensate
the Greece player for relinquishing brinkmanship, it does not offer an early deal but prefers
instead to enter the commitment game, betting that L = 0, that is, the referendum shows that
G will prefer reform over Grexit.
In our interpretation, this outcome of the game is very similar to what transpired in the
months and weeks prior to the bailout: Probably an agreement may well have been possible
as early as March. However, the eurozone representatives, probably trusting in the solidity of
the firewalls constructed for the purpose of containing financial contagion originating from
a Greek failure, apparently decided that the negative consequences of a Graccident could be
dealt with. The Greek negotiators, realising that early concession were off the table since the
scenario of Greece leaving the eurozone did not instil terror any more, decided to hold out
and to take their chances with the referendum, the result of which made unmistakably clear
that the Greek government was committed to remain on the brink. As a result of risk-taking
on both sides, the deal struck between the two actors became more costly for everybody.
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4 Summary and conclusion
In this paper we offered an alternative political-economic explanation of the actions of the
Greek government in the months before the agreement on a third bailout for the country.
In contrast to many other observers we conclude that the actions of the Greek leadership,
especially the decision to ask the voters to reject the earlier terms demanded by the credi-
tors in a referendum, appear to be consistent with a clear strategic calculus. We develop a
game-theoretic model to show that the actions of the Greek government can be understood
as an attempt to get concessions, which can then be used to garner support at home, most
probably already with the next elections in mind.
In our sequential asymmetric-information game we reproduced three cases of parameter-
constellations, the good, the bad and the ugly, which help to better understand the complex-
ity of the negotiations between Greece and its creditors. Especially the ugly third case is infor-
mative: Here an early agreement is possible, yet the eurozone player decides that the negative
consequences of a Graccident can be dealt with. The Greece player in turn decides to hold
out and to take its chances in form of the referendum, which increases the political costs of
a deal. As a result the outcome for the two actors is clearly suboptimal while rational in the
strategic sense.
Our article emphasised several themes. First of all, we underlined that, by engaging in
brinkmanship, it is well possible that the Greek government could induce the creditors to
make a bailout offer that would otherwise not have been made. Second, the Greek brinkman-
ship has not been understood well by many observers. The Greek leadership did not directly
threaten with default or Grexit but instead remained obstinate in the face of rapidly increas-
ing risks of an accidental euro exit. Of course capital flight from Greece and the imposition
of capital controls made things much worse for the Greek economy, but they also meant that
the government was hell-bent on falling off the cliff if necessary. We emphasised, third, that
holding a referendum was a stratagem designed to increase the political costs of having to
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accept exactly those terms the voters had already rejected. This, too, seems to have been
completely misunderstood by many observers. The referendum was a tactical move to en-
able the government to hold out for a hopefully better deal. Of course the country would pay
a high price for the government’s obstinacy, yet the referendum definitely played into Tsipras’
hands in the final phase of the negotiations. Fourth and last, we argued that what made the
final deal better in the eyes of the Greek leadership was that it could be sold better to the
own electorate than what had been on the table until then. As we see it, Tsipras’ rather un-
expected re-election in September 2015 shows that, in the end, he got a deal that was at least
good enough for him.
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